A matter of urgency?

In its report Lessons Learned: Delivering programmes at speed, the National Audit Office prompts project professionals to consider that not all programmes can, or indeed should, be delivered at speed. Read on for an extract…

The pandemic has meant government has needed to deliver programmes at speed, accelerating its normal processes. Government has sometimes done this well. However, delivering at speed creates new and heightened risks for both the programme and the organisation delivering the programme. Given these risks, not all programmes can, or indeed should, be delivered at speed, and we have identified insights to help decision‑makers determine when or how a programme should be delivered at speed and then continually test whether they can successfully deliver the programme.

The National Audit Office reviewed programmes where government aimed to deliver outcomes much quicker than would normally be expected through effective and efficient processes. This includes where external events such as the Covid‑19 pandemic and Brexit meant programme outcomes must be achieved as soon as possible or by a fixed date. It also includes programmes where government had more choice over when outcomes needed to be achieved, such as transforming offender rehabilitation services or improving broadband.

What to consider when deciding to deliver at speed

All programmes should be efficient, avoiding, for example, wasting time or money. However, in some cases, there will be an explicit reason for programmes to be delivered more quickly. Before deciding whether to deliver at speed, decision‑makers must consider why speed is necessary and what this means for the risks they want to take on.

Decision‑makers need to be clear as to why speed is necessary before deciding if a programme should be delivered quickly. Our framework to review programmes sets out the value of teams clarifying early on why a programme is needed and whether this particular programme meets the need. In this context, it includes the reason for speed, whether this is justified and its impact on delivery. This early thinking remains important even when delivering at speed.

The Infrastructure and Projects Authority sets out the need to “invest time in thorough up‑front planning to ensure the project is deliverable and affordable before commitments are given”. Programmes will be delivered at speed for different reasons. The reason will influence the decisions that need to be made and the risks that are taken. Some reasons for speed can be clear. They include:

• An emergency situation. Given the pandemic, government made significant spending decisions and decided to implement various programmes quickly. In a matter of weeks, ventilator procurement had been set up, employment support and business loan schemes were up and running, and the campaigns to house rough sleepers and deliver free school meals vouchers were designed and implemented.
• A fixed deadline. From London being awarded the Olympic and Paralympic Games in July 2005, government and its delivery partners had seven years to get ready. This included acquiring and preparing land, securing planning permission, undertaking design work and procurement, building and fitting out the venues, alongside planning a lasting legacy.

We have also seen programmes delivered at speed simply because government wants to achieve the outcomes sooner. In these cases, without a clear rationale for speed, it can be more difficult to generate stakeholder support, and it will be harder to justify taking value‑for‑money risks. Decision‑makers need to weigh the advantages of earlier outcomes against the risks.

The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) launched its rehabilitation reforms with timescales set by ministers to deliver before the 2015 election. In setting out to meet these timescales, the MoJ did not adequately test how the transformed system might work before letting contracts, and did not have a good understanding of delivery models, working practices and governance. Its rushed implementation introduced significant risks with far‑reaching consequences, including poor value for money for the taxpayer.

Alongside achieving outcomes sooner, speed creates opportunities to learn how programmes could be more efficient. In 2020, HMRC conducted a specific exercise to capture lessons learned from introducing the Covid‑19 employment support schemes and is using these to inform how it is managing the schemes.

Decision‑makers need to understand the risk appetite

Delivering programmes quickly can significantly increase value‑for‑money risks. These risks may fall within a programme or more widely across government or a department. Government has sometimes recognised the increased risk – for example, accounting officers have sought ministerial directions where they have felt a proposal or programme raised feasibility or value‑for‑money concerns. When responding to the pandemic, and as prescribed by the Treasury’s Managing Public Money paper, some accounting officers obtained directions from ministers to proceed with programmes, as their speed meant they could not gain assurance over value for money.

Given the increased risks, and with limited finances and people, government cannot deliver all programmes at speed. Our report on initial learning from the government’s response to the pandemic highlighted the need to be clear about risk appetite and tolerance as the basis for choosing which trade‑offs should be made in emergencies.

At the start of a programme, decision‑makers need to identify and understand the risks, benefits and reasons for speed, to decide whether to take the increased risks or, for example, change what will be delivered. Risk may arise from the existing environment, such as an ageing digital landscape or inadequate data, or through simply doing things quickly.

When procuring for additional freight capacity in advance of Brexit, the Department for Transport (DfT) followed a procurement route that allowed it to act quickly, but carried greater legal risk. The accounting officer recognised that the DfT was taking forward a “novel and exceptional proposition” requiring careful judgement. The accounting officer concluded that there were high levels of risk, but that failure to act would lead to government losing the ability to secure the freight capacity needed to help protect the movement of critical goods. There was subsequently a legal challenge to the procurement process, which led to an out‑of‑court settlement.

Examples of the risks of delivering programmes at speed

We have seen how delivering programmes quickly can create potential risks. Here are three examples of risk and where we have seen aspects of this risk:

1. Cost risk: Options being kept open for longer

During the early stages of the pandemic, government started a programme to secure as many ventilators as possible, as quickly as possible. The approach prioritised speed and maximised the chances of success before considering cost. It included a willingness to accept that prices were higher than the normal market rate; deliberately supporting multiple options; and drawing significantly on technical expertise and capacity from the private sector. As its approach did not prioritise cost, government controlled costs where it could, and recovered some of its committed spending once it became apparent that fewer ventilators were needed than they had originally believed.

A government review of the Covid‑19 shielding programme for the clinically extremely vulnerable concluded that, due to the speed and context in which the programme was developed, it had to be largely offered to everyone, leading to inefficiencies. It noted that, should shielding be needed again, adopting a local support model could improve flexibility and potentially be more cost‑effective. Government applied many of these lessons to the second iteration of shielding in November 2020.

2. Delivery risk: A greater chance things may go wrong

To support small businesses facing cash‑flow problems due to the pandemic, government moved quickly to set up the Bounce Back Loan Scheme. It introduced the programme without the controls we would normally expect to see, such as those over duplicate applications, and with less strict eligibility criteria than other comparable government loan schemes. This increased credit and fraud‑related risks, which meant, at the time of our report in October 2020, the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS) and the British Business Bank initially estimated that between 35 and 60 per cent of loans may not be repaid. They are currently reviewing these figures.

The deadlines to implement the Green Homes Grant Voucher Scheme constrained the time to consult with stakeholders, procure an administrator, and design and launch the scheme. BEIS and external assurance highlighted several risks of proceeding quickly, but BEIS accepted these risks. The fast pace constrained its procurement options, its engagement with the installer market and, alongside the short duration of the scheme, made it hard for energy efficiency installers to mobilise to meet demand. Despite BEIS’s considerable efforts, the rushed delivery and implementation of the scheme has significantly reduced the benefits that might have been achieved, caused frustration for homeowners and installers, and had limited impact on job creation for the longer term

3. Capacity risk: Teams being overworked or unsustainable performance

The volume of work required to prepare for Brexit was significant, with more than 22,000 civil servants working at the peak in October 2019. Staff turnover in Brexit‑related roles was higher than for the civil service in general, with a particularly acute problem at more senior grades.

The MoJ lacked the capacity and capability to manage the difficulties affecting the new‑generation electronic monitoring programme given competing priorities and wider challenges. There were high, competing demands for scarce skills, in particular for technical expertise, across the MoJ. We found many staff were pulled onto higher‑priority programmes such as the Transforming Rehabilitation reforms, which were delivering at speed. During the pandemic, staff were moved to work seen as a higher priority, such as to support the Everyone In programme to support rough sleepers.

To deliver a programme successfully at speed, decision-makers need to ask...

Why the programme needs to be delivered quickly. Determining if speed is necessary and justifiable to decide where risks can be taken.

How much risk they want to, and can, take on within the programme and across the organisation. Understanding the risks to value for money, such as things being missed or increased costs, and their risk appetite will help them decide whether those risks are worth taking.

Whether they can effectively monitor and manage the risks of speed by, for example:

• Including speed as a specific programme objective to provide a clear framework for decision-making and help make trade-offs between speed, cost and outcomes.
• Building teams with the right leadership, skills and experience to make clear, timely and reliable decisions.
• Tailoring processes to add value and momentum to programme decision-making.
• Recognising the uncertainties of delivering at speed and managing these.

 

This article is an edited extract from the National Audit Office’s report Lessons Learned: Delivering programmes at speed. The full report, including advice and recommendations on what needs to be in place to monitor and manage risks, can be found at National Audit Office.